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‘He who seeks the salvation of the soul, of his own and of others, should not seek it 
along the avenue of politics, for the quite different tasks of politics can only be 
solved by violence. The genius or demon of politics lives in an inner tension with 
the god of love…This tension can at any time lead to an irreconcilable conflict’ 
(Weber 1991 [1919], 126). 
 
 
This paper explores the way violence is simultaneously absent and present in our 
everyday understanding of politics and the State. It argues that politics does not 
have to be an arena inherently and unavoidably reliant on the tools of violence. 
Indeed, politics could be seen as primarily an arena for violence reduction. Social 
action on violence is one route towards realizing such a goal. However, the 
ontological assumptions about human violence behind, for instance, the Weberian 
approach to the modern State remain a conceptual limit to such social action. They 
have provided an apparently intuitive foundation for why violence and its 
monopoly must be coupled to our understanding of politics and the State. While 
there have been philosophical challenges to this, they ultimately fail, it is argued, 
to provide a focus on violence as a phenomenon with its own distinctions. Social 
action on violence raises new consciousness about its lived experiences and 
multiple forms, including state violence. Such action can influence and be 
influenced by an emergent epistemological leap in the study of violence, made 
possible by the interdisciplinary potential of new knowledge. Over time, there is a 
source for a new foundation for the State and Politics, which does not rely on the 
tools of violence. 
 
Weber’s proposition about the impossibility of avoiding violence in politics and 
the importance of a state monopoly of violence to the modern state, remains a 
reference point not just for political scientists but for the real world of politics. It 
has also meant that the violence deeply present in state practices and political life 
in general, is often not recognized as such. Violence in society is effectively 
removed through the creation of a state monopoly which is also ‘legitimate’. 
Weber’s attention to the concept of ‘legitimacy’ was, however, limited or what I 
call ‘thin’. It means paradoxically, as Schinkel (2010, 30-31) points out, that 
‘legitimate’ violence (potestas) exists only by virtue of ‘non-legitimate’ private 
violence (violentia). The modern State’s very existence is based on this distinction 
and its preservation, thus limiting the imagination of a state which actually 
reduces violence by virtue of its own non-violence. Weber’s human ontology of 
violence is rarely seen other than a ‘common sense’. While Schinkel himself 
doubts such a possibility, this paper argues social action on violence can at least 
begin a process of re-conceptualising the State and political life as possible 
without violence. 
 
The first part of the paper explores varied efforts to counter Weber’s propositions. 
The most influential of these still rest on a human ontology of violence. Violence 
is better understood as a phenomenon, it is argued, ‘without’ politics, in order to 
understand its role ‘within’ politics. Rather than an intrinsic and inevitable 
relationship, we can trace how humans do act – and more frequently so in recent 
decades – to de-sanction violences through their social actions, particularly as 
their sensibilities towards violence increase. Elias (1994, 2005 ) argued that 
sensibilisation was an historical process of ‘civilization’ in Europe, involving 
affect control and self restraint, beginning with elites and the monopolisation 
process. However, such sensibilisation as has occurred, took centuries and has 
remained incomplete and even reversible, even more so outside Europe. Elias 
himself accounts for the collapse of the Weimar Republic by the way that an 
economic and political crisis foundered on the structural weakness of its monopoly 
of violence (1998). However, this paper argues that violence sensibilities do not 
just ‘happen’ over time, but require  active processes of what I call ‘emotional 
enlightenment’ (Pearce, 2018 forthcoming). Social mobilisation creates political 
possibilities for turning new social sensibilities into state action as ‘law’1, but 
underpinned by social and mental health practices, that in turn create the 
conditions to live without violence.  
 
The second part of the paper is therefore focused on violence as a phenomenon 
subject to social action. An alternative foundation for politics could emerge 
through such action alongside openness to new knowledges about violence from 
interdisciplinary insights, in turn opening up new fields for action. From 
philosophy to biology to sociology and history, as well as related disciplines, 
violence’s distinctions and particularities emerge. We have new tools for 
comprehending violence and the mechanisms of its reproduction. By bringing 
violence back to the body, understood as a social body, it can be distinguished 
from biological aggression. The acts and actions of somatic harm that constitute 
violence are meaning laden and generating (Pearce 2018 forthcoming). Its effects 
are transmitted and reproduced through time and space (Pearce 2007a). This 
second part of the paper, therefore, explores how the idea of the ‘social body’ 
                                               
1 The discussion on Benjamin on the relationship of law to violence shows that this remains a 
problematic configuration.  The kind of law that emerges when the state responds to new social 
sensibilities on violence remains a topic of further discussion 
might enable us to rethink the ‘body politic’. The social body is a vulnerable body 
(Miller 2002; Bergoffen 2003; Staudigl, 2004, 2013), to physical, emotional and 
psychic harm. Acknowledging the ‘vulnerable body’ clarifies the origins of the 
intuition around the coupling of violence and politics. Ongoing somatic impacts of 
violence in private and public social interactions, have made it almost natural for 
politics and the State to be structured around our mastering of each other, the 
‘domination of man over man’ as Weber expressed it. 
 
Recognising the vulnerable body is not an abstract process. Hence, acknowledging 
the way social action increasingly puts this onto the public agenda enables us to 
imagine a politics whose tasks are not best resolved by violence. Such action 
includes, for instance, mobilization by sections of society across more and more 
cultures against abuse in the intimate sphere of social life and naming it as 
violence. Politics itself can become a field where the conditions to live without 
violence can be struggled over. As violence is grasped as a phenomenon rather 
than in selected aspects (Schinkel, 2010), its inevitable reduction through 
monopolisation is no longer taken for granted. The de-coupling of violence from 
politics conceptually becomes a possibility through the recognition and exposure 
of its contingent expressions at various levels and layers of human sociability and 
social experience. I call this a reverse ‘re-coupling’ of violence and politics, where 
violence reduction - not its centralised monopolisation - is at the core of political 
life, potentially reshaping the way human affairs are managed. 
 
 
1. Human Violence in our Foundational Theories of Politics and their Critics 
 
1.1. Violence as Legitimated State Violence 
 
Of course, we should not begin with Weber when talking about a violence 
ontology in politics. The figure who first springs up is Thomas Hobbes, also 
writing in a tumultuous moment in history. Hobbes first set up the intrinsic 
relationship between humanity’s ever present disposition for violence and the idea 
of the sovereign monopoly on coercive force. This makes politics possible, argued 
Hobbes (Hobbes 2011, 89), as well as all the creative and productive pursuits 
which can happen when there is a ‘society’. 
 
Whereas Hobbes wrote against the backcloth of the ‘early modern state’ in 
formation, Weber wrote about the ‘modern state’ of the twentieth century, which 
in turn was a response to the formation of nation states from the seventeenth to the 
nineteenth centuries, culminating in the First World War of 1914-1918. In 
historical hindsight, these ‘European centuries’ and the capacity of Europe over 
time to contain intrastate violences through building up national armies and state 
taxation capacity, gave European political thought a head start in defining what the 
state is. With much of the world still under European colonial influence, alongside 
the socio-political upheavals in many parts of the world, and the ‘American 
century’ yet to begin, Weber seemed to offer an insightful and apparently 
indisputable articulation of how the State and politics were inherently configured 
by the ontological violences of humanity. He also offered a chance to contain 
them. The State, argues Schinkel (2010:30), became ‘the people’s means of moral 
protection against themselves’. Violence and violence reproduction by the State is 
no longer ‘violence’, but legitimated protective action. The question is, whether by 
the beginning of the 21st century, we can do better than this. Have we made 
sufficient theoretical and empirical progress on rethinking the nexus of violence, 
politics and the State? 
 
As Andreas Anter (2014, 48) in his study of Weber’s theory of the modern State 
points out, the idea of the state as based on command and compliance was the 
accepted norm when Weber wrote. However, Weber believed that rulership was 
not a monopoly of the state and also that all rule requires a basis for its legitimacy. 
He argued that the legitimation of domination by the modern state is ‘by virtue of 
the belief in the validity of legal statute and functional ‘competence’ based on 
rationally created rules (italics in original) (Weber 1991 [1919], 79). Weber insists 
on justifications for rule and for the violence that underpins it. However, his 
concept of legitimacy remains deeply problematic as a means to do this. In his 
own words in the text, what some translate as ‘physical violence’ (Weber 2000, 
310-311) and others as ‘physical force’ (Weber 1991, 78; Waters and Waters 
2015, 136), is ‘legitimate’ in as much as people believe it to be legitimate and in 
the validity of the legal statutes. He sought no transcendental conceptualisation of 
legitimacy. Thus, the violence that the State uses is rarely ‘seen’ as violence, but 
as merely the repertoire of actions needed for rulership, legitimated by belief in its 
legality, in turn formalised by statute. 
 
It was not Weber’s intention to “justify” state violence. His non-normative 
approach to ‘legitimacy’ was intended to describe the basis of acceptance of 
different forms of rulership. However, it is in the name of claims to ‘legitimacy’ 
that rulers, even those backed by legality, use violence. A significant debate took 
place around these terms in the key inter-war years in Germany. One, Walter 
Benjamin’s Critique of Violence, was written just a year after Weber wrote 
Vocation as Politics, and was influenced by the same events. It was written before 
Benjamin embraced Marxism in 1924 (Khatib 2016, 43). The other, is the 
abidingly influential anti liberal text on Legality and Legitimacy, written by Carl 
Schmitt in 1932, just as the Weimar Republic entered the final phase of its 
political crisis and violence was escalating. These two thinkers, from distinct poles 
on the political spectrum, illustrate the vulnerability of Weber’s efforts to find a 
liberal political solution to ontological violence. Both also assume an ontology of 
human violence. 
 
Walter Benjamin questions the idea that law can ever offer a legitimate 
justification of violence, either natural law or positive law. In both cases, violence 
is merely justified in terms of the means it offers for a just end (natural law) or in 
terms of the justness of the means used to ensure the end (positive law), i.e. 
preservation of the law itself. Thus, law making violence and law preserving 
violence are both expressions of violence which are not justified or justifiable 
except as means. Violence can be neither a legal nor ethical goal. In Critique of 
Violence (1921, 2007), Benjamin was asking whether there is a distinction 
between legitimate and illegitimate violence. This distinction goes to the heart of 
Weber’s effort to legitimate the violence used by the modern State. Rational legal 
forms of authority do so through the rules that people believe are valid. Yet the 
phenomenon of violence is ultimately the instrument in all cases, so Benjamin’s 
question, (when does violence become law?) means that selectively recognising 
some violence as legitimate remains highly problematic. Without straying into 
Benjamin’s efforts to find grounds for a ‘pure violence’, the key point is that 
violence as law has no more justification when it is used to preserve the law or to 
make the law. Law cannot legitimise violence as a just means when that means 
merely preserves the law. The law is born of violence. Violence in the name of 
state law enforcement under elected governments believed to be legitimate is 
hardly unusual. The “Black Lives Matter” campaign in the United States has made 
it its mission since 2012 to expose selective state violence, in just one example 
from recent history.  
 
However, the Weberian proposition is vulnerable in other ways. What happens 
when violence is used within (and perhaps against) the political system and when 
Weber’s ‘thin’ legitimacy or belief in the state’s monopoly is incapable of 
preserving it? Violence of multiple kinds grows within political systems despite 
claims to a legitimate state monopoly. As commitments to liberal cosmopolitanism 
and neoliberal globalisation faded in the wake of the 2008 global financial crisis, 
this weakness became clearer as populisms of right and left sought to re-found the 
State in relationship to its ‘enemy’. Liberal democracy increasingly found itself in 
the middle of polarising narratives, amplified by social media, in which hate and 
threats of violence were commonplace. An article in the UK Guardian following 
the Brexit vote and the murder of Labour MP Jo Cox in July 2016 vividly reflects 
on the changing language of politics in the country that ensued. The journalist 
asked, how did the language of politics get so toxic? He suggested it had to do 
with something deep and subtly rooted: 
 
’a careless, universal conception of politics as a battleground, a metaphor so 
entrenched that we don’t even notice it...What is stranger still is the speed with 
which the old rhetoric of violence and confrontation has returned across the 
political spectrum. On the morning of the referendum result, Farage celebrated a 
victory that had been won “without a single bullet being fired”. When Thomas 
Mair, Cox’s alleged killer, appeared in court on Saturday 18 June, he gave his 
name as “death to traitors, freedom for Britain”. Not two weeks later, the term 
“traitor” was being used by some of Jeremy Corbyn’s supporters as a standard 
term of abuse for anyone deemed disloyal (Bland 2016). 
 
Carl Schmitt’s anti liberal arguments have gained new resonance in the violent 
narratives emerging in contemporary liberal orders. Violence, he argued, is always 
a potential reality, but the State must identify the ‘enemy’ (Schmitt 1996). Schmitt 
assumed that humans have a need for domination and will kill for their 
convictions, and liberalism cannot provide a form of politics that recognises that. 
The way of avoiding the inevitable enmity and conflict between men and its 
descent into ‘absolute violence’ and ultimately annihilation, is precisely when the 
State acts to decide who is the enemy and acts to defeat the enemy without 
eliminating the friend/enemy distinction per se (Bernstein 2013, 44). Schmitt uses 
the potential for violence as a reason why the State must assume a sovereign role 
in determining when that should be. He does so in order to put forward his 
argument for the inherent vulnerability of parliamentary democracy, which uses 
legality and illegality as arbitrary interpretations of the ‘empty functionalism of a 
mere arithmetic majority and minority calculation’ (Schmitt 2004 [1932], 30). 
Rather than active consent, legitimacy, is for Schmitt merely a choice not to resist 
authority, a right which itself always raises the latent potential for violence 
(McCormick 2004, xxiv).  
 
The relevance of Schmitt’s perspective is how it resonates with polarised political 
moments in history, such as our contemporary one. Liberal parliamentarianism 
only offers the possibility for a heterogeneous plurality of views, he suggests, not 
for an expression of the democratic will. ’Every democracy’, he argues ‘rests on 
the presupposition of the indivisibly similar, entire, unified people, for them there 
is, then in fact and in essence, no minority and still less a number of firm, 
permanent minorities’ (Schmitt 2004, 28). One does not have to agree with 
Schmitt, to see how his line of reasoning echoes through the decades and could 
easily find expression in US President Trump’s frustration with Congress and with 
the numerical questioning of his ‘popular vote’. And Schmitt left out the impact of 
the rising number of actual assaults and intimidations from the right on the 
socialist representatives in the Weimar Republic in his attempt to explain the 
inherent weakness of parliamentary constitutionalism. Violence remains 
potentially part of the repertoire of actual politics, and a thinly legitimised 
monopoly within a rule based liberal order does not prevent that.  
 
1.2. From Biopower to Bare Life, from Non-Dominating Power to Agonistic 
Politics: Critiquing and Re-imagining the Politics and Violence Nexus 
 
Weber, Benjamin and Schmitt, from the liberal, left and right of the political 
spectrum accepted the human ontology of violence and engaged with how political 
orders emerged from that premise. Michel Foucault (1982) argued that violence 
came to be used less and less by the State in Europe as it adopted a range of tools 
to discipline and dominate its subjects. Foucault explored how the State’s use of 
violence and dominating, coercive power, evolved into techniques of power, and 
specifically ‘biopower’, exercised at the level of life rather than over the subject’s 
life and death. Violence, however, almost disappears under the weight of his 
conceptualisation of governmentality. It is Giorgio Agamben (1998) who shows 
that violence remains part of the repertoire of sovereign power in its foundation 
and in its control over the living. The political he argues (1998, 181) is founded 
upon the sovereign’s power to exclude while including life under its power to kill 
with impunity, reducing it to ‘bare life’. It is the sovereign who decides the state of 
exception and the boundary between law and non-law. This echoes Schmitt, but 
Agamben is unmasking its dangers. The US prison at Guantanamo Bay and its 
treatment of alleged terrorists outside any legal process, was the backcloth in real 
life to his arguments.  
 
Agamben, brings back the ongoing presence of violence in politics and the State. 
Others have challenged the ontology itself or created new analytical tools for how 
politics, the State and violence could be re-configured. Hannah Arendt (1970) has 
been the most foundational in terms of her effort to reconstitute politics on power 
not violence, power conceptualised as its opposite.  Arendt suggests that politics 
need not involve either violence nor the domination of man over man. Arendt’s 
political world is social, plural and intercommunicative, and formed by power as 
its ‘end’ unlike violence, which is a means forever needing justification. Violence 
can never be legitimate, whereas power emerges through people coming together, 
and requires no other legitimation than the reciprocity and consensus around its 
beginning. Her emphasis on power as consensus, nevertheless, raises questions of 
whether her approach fails to embrace the inevitable conflicts that, it could be 
argued, are the lifeblood of politics and the pursuit of strategic goals within it 
(Habermas 1977, 15).  
 
Here Chantal Mouffe (2005a, 2005b) steps in to suggest that politics could be 
conceived of as a realm of agonism rather than antagonism. She is as opposed to 
Arendt’s understanding of the political as a space for freedom and public 
deliberation, as she is to liberalism’s assumption that plural interests can be 
reconciled in the private sphere, leaving the political as a neutral sphere of 
administration. Writing at the turn of the millennium and at the height of 
neoliberalism’s rise, when politics in the developed economies of the West seemed 
to be increasingly reduced to an instrumental activity where private interests 
dominated within a framework of apparently neutral procedures, Mouffe was 
interested in the ongoing real antagonism of incommensurable world views. Her 
agonistic order would mobilise political passions, and democracy would offer a 
robust space of contention between competing positions on questions of poverty 
and injustice, for example, and the possibility of the construction of a new 
hegemony. The acceptance of such contestations is the legitimate meaning of 
politics, limiting the resort to violent destructiveness of the political itself. 
 
However, while violence is an implicit potential of conflict for Mouffe, it is not a 
problematic in its own right. The distinction between conflict and violence is not 
always clear or when exactly the former might degenerate into the latter. Arendt 
on the other hand, has, what Frazer and Hutchings (2008, 105) argue, is an abstract 
and disembodied account of violence. Arendt challenged the scientists of the 
1960s who argued that violence was an instinct, and rather viewed rage and the 
violence which sometimes accompanied it, as part of a repertoire of natural human 
emotions which enabled us also to be moved by injustice. Arendt and Mouffe 
demonstrate that we ought not to consider ourselves dependent on Weber for our 
understanding of politics, the State and violence. We have tools that help us to 
imagine a politics which is built on a non-dominating form of power or to imagine 
an agonistic politics which accounts for human passions but without descending 
into violent enmity capable of destroying political order itself. In neither case, 
however, do we have a satisfactory account of violence and how the violence 
‘outside’ politics might impact on the conflict inherent in politics as strategic 
action and which remains embedded and latent in incommensurable world views. 
 
2. Violence: A Phenomenon Subject to Social Action 
 
Weber’s ‘thin legitimacy’ does not provide a means of recognising the dangers of 
the state’s violent power over life and death. Nor have liberal democratic politics 
eliminated the risk that politics can allow the will of the people to be claimed -
potentially violently -by a faction, who might win the power of the State through 
media and other techniques outside the parliamentary system but which are not 
necessarily illegal. We need tools to enable us to recognise the significance of 
persistent violences in the multiple spaces of human socialisation and interaction 
outside and against the State and how they might impact on the way we believe 
our State has to be constructed and how politics is practiced. The only way, it is 
argued here, that we can begin to appreciate the ongoing role of violence in 
politics and how to address it, is to focus on violence itself. It is to recognise the 
potent qualities and properties of violence, not as a human ontology but as 
something which across the socialisation spaces has communicated and 
constructed meanings in human social interactions. Rather than see these violences 
as an inevitable part of human existence which the State monopoly mitigates, it is 
argued here that those persistent violences are often reproduced by the State, while 
they also limit our capacity to imagine a politics which is not shaped by their 
intractability.  
 
There is historical evidence that the State monopoly where it has worked alongside 
a functioning rule of law, has reduced violence measured in homicides (Elias, 
1994, 2005; Pinker 2011; Eisner 2014). However, it has been estimated that only 
25 countries and 15 percent of the world’s population live in such ‘open access 
orders’ today (North, Wallis, and Weingast 2009, xii). And even in such orders 
where problems of organised and homicidal violence have diminished, varied 
forms of violence still impact on the private and public spheres. There is not space 
to develop that line of argument further here. Rather, this article aims to steer our 
focus onto the necessity of unpacking the problematic of violence itself and to 
question our selectivity towards the violences which matter to politics. In this 
context, it is important to see that how across time and culture, the ‘modern 
semantics of violence’ (Schinkel 2010, 31) changes. It does so, I argue, in an 
iterative process involving greater sensibilization to violence leading to social 
action on violence, to greater openness to the new knowledges which deepen our 
understanding of the phenomenon itself, and in turn, to further social action. In 
this way, the paradoxical logic that Schinkel identifies (2010, 31) by which the 
State would lose its core function without private violence, which is the ‘bad/evil’ 
violence juxtaposed to the ‘good’ violence of the State, gradually disappears. The 
conceptual possibility of a politics without violence can emerge. 
 
Stephen Pinker (2011, 680-81) highlighted five factors which have contributed to the 
reduction of violence: the Leviathan (accompanied by Justitia), gentle commerce, 
feminization, the expanding circle of human connections and the escalation of reason.        
I would argue that what he omits is the active agency involved in the naming and de-
sanctioning of many forms of violence previously unrecognised as such. It was a 
feminist movement that enabled ‘feminization’ of professional and political life to 
take place, and then for violent experiences of women to be taken seriously in the 
public and political realms.  From child punishment being recognised as abuse and 
violence, to violence in the domestic sphere being recognised as a crime, to rape in 
war being recognised as unacceptable yet as normalised a part of warfare as combat 
between soldiers, the late twentieth century began to show sensitivities to forms of 
violence unimaginable in the past. Social movements, from feminism to victims’ 
movements, and civil society organisations dedicated to human rights, for example, 
have played a critical role in opening up discussion on these and other expressions of 
violence. Violence in its multiple expressions has become a focus of social action, 
and in the process the threshold of acceptance of violence has lowered, at least in 
some parts of the world2. From torture and disappearance to bullying and mental 
health, the need for new understandings of the embodied social logics and effects of 
violence have been placed on the public agenda. New forms of violence become in 
this way part of political debate, demanding political action. Many more remain 
outside it. De-sanctioning tends itself to select aspects of violence. Only when 
                                               
2 For empirical examples of this see Pearce (2007b) and McGee and Pearce (eds) (2009) 
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2.1. The Biology of Aggression and the Sociology of Violence 
 
Getting to grips with the character of violence, involves an interdisciplinary 
conversation on how the biology of aggression translates into the social body and 
ultimately the body politic. However, nothing exposes the weakness of our 
interdisciplinary conversations more than the study of violence (except perhaps the 
study of peace). In the 1960s, natural scientists tended to offer reductionist 
determinism, while social scientists denied that the biological body had any 
bearing on our social world. However, the fields of biology and neuroscience, for 
instance, have made enormous strides in their own engagement with the reciprocal 
impacts of the social and the biological. It is increasingly acknowledged that the 
biological body is entwined in systems of social relationships. Genetic and 
evolutionary explanations which have at times guided thinking on a human 
ontology of violence, are now placed within a range of other scientific studies, 
which reveal the impact of social relationships on our bodies and even our gene 
expression. Epigenetics, for example, has begun to show that childhood abuse can 
modify DNA to keep genes from being expressed, genes which might help in the 
management of stress, and can explain the long term physical and psychological 
problems that confront such children. Whether and why some abused children 
become abusers becomes at least a relevant question for the study of violence. In 
this short section, it is not possible to detail all the potential for new conversations 
between natural and social scientists. However, our greater understanding of 
violence suggest that it is worth revisiting the human ontology arguments and how 
they impact on our construction of the political. Not all science necessarily 
challenges the ontology argument, of course. Stephen Pinker has also shown that 
violence can reduce, but he is also committed to an ultimately Hobbesian 
explanation of its origins. Yet, if we make a distinction between aggression as a 
biological impulse and violence as a meaning laden and meaning generating one, 
we can begin to question the Hobbesian logics that still imbue our politics. 
 
Felicity de Zulueta a biologist, psychotherapist and psychiatrist makes the 
following summary of the differences between aggression and violence: 
 
“…aggression is a form of social behaviour studied by ethologists, biologists and 
psychologists, whereas violence is more about the interpretation that is given to a 
form of social behaviour, an interpretation that is essentially determined by the 
social context in which we live. At times both terms are interchangeable but at other 
times they are not: an interaction deemed abusive or violence in one culture may be 
considered quite ‘normal’ in another” (2006, 3). 
 
Once we begin to accept that aggression yes, is part of our human ontology, but 
violence is a part of an interpretative realm, we begin the journey towards 
understanding the distinctiveness of violence. Aggression and our capacity to address 
it, is part of the emotional/cerebral circuits which manage our responses to the social 
world. Our experiences in that world, generate stored memories of pain and threats. 
Pathbreaking work by psychoanalyst, John Bowlby (1971), drew attention to the 
importance of protection and safety to human survival, alongside reproduction and 
nutrition. He roots attachment in evolutionary theory and the gene-determined bias to 
reduce our risk of coming to harm through forming intimate relationships with a 
sexual partner, parents and offspring (Bowlby 1988, 90). Such relationships of 
proximity give humans the security to act in the world and to explore it (Holmes 
1993, 67). However, separation and threatened separation generate frustration, 
anxiety and anger. While, in evolutionary terms, these emotions are functional to 
maintaining the intimate relationships, they can easily become distorted in ways that 
are dysfunctional. Bowlby argues that the latter is responsible for a great deal of the 
‘maladaptive violence’ in families (Bowlby, 1988:91), while trauma through abuse, 
deprivation and loss can profoundly affect the way we feel and behave (De Zulueta 
2006, 54). 
 
This intimate space of socialisation is just one where it is possible to explore how 
ruptures in attachment bonds generate stress and disrupt the emotional circuits which 
guide our capacity to relate to others. Of course, this only illustrates a line of enquiry 
into how the biological and social body interact and whether in particular 
circumstances one can trace connections between traumatic experiences in childhood 
and violent responses and actions in adolescence, for example. It leads to questions 
on the temporalities of violence and its transmission over time and across 
generations.  
 
We can also explore the transmission of violence across social spaces. How do 
experiences of trauma and violence in the intimate space impact on social interactions 
in other spaces such as the street and the school? Without suggesting a crude 
linearity, there is scope for further empirical work on what has been called by social 
scientists a ‘violence continuum’ (Scheper-Hughes and Bourgois 2004). A dialogue 
between the natural and social sciences on violence has become a fruitful one. And 
this is captured in the following words of biologist Debra Niehoff, in which she gives 
us a step further towards an understanding of the distinctions of violence: 
 
“Violence is the failure to respect the boundary between acceptable and 
unacceptable aggression. If we want to prevent this breakdown, to have people 
reserve their strongest responses for true emergencies, we must protect the nervous 
system from injury, destabilising levels of stress, drugs, isolation and victimisation. 
We must strive to create a safe environment flexible enough to accommodate some 
risk taking, structured enough to prevent confusion…Behaviour is developed not 
determined. And because social behaviours like aggression lie at the cutting edge of 
adaptation to the environment, they are among the behavioural elements most open 
to change” (Niehoff 1999, 261). 
 
By bringing in the idea of a boundary between “acceptable and unacceptable 
aggression”, Niehoff raises the question of why violence is recognised as such in 
differential, culturally mediated ways. We give varied meanings to the acts of pain on 
the bodies of others and ourselves. Hurting a child can be punishment, discipline or 
violence. A value neutral definition of violence which assumes that it is recognisably 
an act of physical force which aims to harm is questionable. Acts of meaning and 
judgement are involved, and, legitimation - as in Weber’s attempt to legitimate the 
violence of the State - is always ‘liable to be contested’ (Riches 1986, 11). It is the 
social scientists who take up these aspects of violence to open the discussion around 
its meanings. Anthropologist David Riches searches for the potency of violence as a 
social and cultural resource that is cross cultural, and not dependent on the English 
language word for ‘violence’, absent in some cultures. He argues that violence is 
equally efficacious for practical (instrumental) and symbolic (expressive) purposes 
(ibid:25). That is its potency. And the notion of expressive violence, leads us towards 
violence and meaning. Sociologist Randall Collins has located the micro situational 
meanings of violence in the “contours of situations, which shape the emotions and 
acts of the individuals who step inside them” (Collins 2008, 1) and the way 
“interaction among several human bodies in close communication is quite literally 
driving their individual physiology from the outside in” (Collins 2013, 140). 
Collins’s extensive empirical work brings him to focus on the physicality of the 
moment of violence making. Literary scholar and philosopher, Jan Philipp 
Reemtsma, who uses sociological research “but is not beholden to it” (Reemtsma 
2012, ix), also argues that violence “is first and foremost physical violence, the 
nonconsensual assault on another’s body. ‘First and foremost’ means that physical 
violence is the point of reference for other, nonphysical forms of violence” (ibid, 55). 
 
The reduction of violence to its physicality, ignores for some the misrecognition 
(Bourdieu 2004) of repeated actions of somatic harm not recognised as such. Yet, 
Bourdieu also sees symbolic violence in physical terms, when he notes the trembling 
of women who have been persistently subordinated when they speak with others 
(ibid). Symbolic violence generates psychic somatic harm, often manifested 
physically. Structural violence (Galtung 1969) results in many forms of somatic harm 
when a child suffers from avoidable malnutrition. The debate on the wider and 
narrower parameters of violence remains unresolved. However, the search beyond 
definitions and causality towards the meanings in violence, has led to efforts to give 
violence its distinctive weight and significance as a phenomenon. Reemtsma is 
concerned to understand violence phenomenologically, not in terms of the perpetrator 
or his intention: “but the deed in relation to the body on which it is inflicted” (ibid, 
56-57). The usefulness of the phenomenological lens is that it takes us away from the 
selectivity around violence and its particular expressions, such as self-directed, 
interpersonal, collective, private or public. We can appreciate why it is that “making 
sense” of violence seems counter-intuitive, and why we so readily allow an entity we 
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call the “State” to essentially select for us which violences matter. By highlighting 
the centrality of the sensory and bodily experienced world, phenomenology, helps us 
begin the process of making sense of violence from precisely that point. As Michael 
Staudigl argues, such a perspective on violence exposes the lived and vulnerable 
body in the whole spectrum of its embodiment, in contrast to the “underexposed 
notion of human corporeality” in most disciplines (2004, 57). 
 
2.2. Violence Without Politics: From the Biological to the Social Body 
 
This brief and selective dip into varied disciplinary lenses on violence, aims to 
emphasise the richness of the current debate and how far it has travelled since 1919. 
It also brings us to an attempt to suggest a way of thinking about violence which 
could give it a centrality of its own. This underlines the incapacity of politics as 
currently conceptualised and practiced to offer a route to reducing it in all its forms 
and expressions. Violence must be recognised not only as meaning laden, but also as 
meaning generating.  
 
Violence belongs to our sense making bodily selves, with origins in our social body. 
Its distinctiveness has to be sought in the fact that an act or action of pain on or harm 
to the body of oneself or another is literally not senseless. As phenomenologist, 
James Dodd writes: “violence is situated in a world of sense, but in a manner that 
seems to hold it apart from sense” (2009, 15). Violence brings a rupture in our sense 
making, but that itself enables its perpetrator to communicate something about the 
world to the victim. Our difficulty of expressing pain in language tells us a great deal 
about the potency of its communicative power: “Physical pain does not simply resist 
language but actively destroys it, bringing about an immediate reversion to a state 
anterior to language, to the sounds and cries a human being makes before language is 
learned” (Scarry 1985, 4). Some have argued that violence not only communicates 
meaning but that it generates meaning and goes beyond a mean-ends continuum, that 
violence is autotelic (e.g., Schinkel 2010). The notion that violence could generate its 
own sense, is strengthened by the example of the Islamic State suicide bombers. 
These mostly young men appear to generate meaning in their own lives as well as in 
the world they aim to re-found, through an act of self and social destruction. Another 
way that violence could be understood to generate sense, is the way, as Schinkel 
notes, “many people feel drawn to violence because violence itself can give pleasure” 
(2010, 122). He links this to the pervasiveness of “frictional violence” (ibid., 129), 
straddling the real and the fictional worlds, where many will encounter violence on a 
daily basis even when they live in varying degrees of threat of actual violence. 
 
The differential meanings borne by and generated through violence for women and 
men, are also part of the story of its distinctiveness as a phenomenon. While women 
do commit homicides, it could be argued that violence does not have the identity 
affirming character for women that it does for men. Indeed, women tend to be more 
female the less violent they are, which is the opposite for men. Men fulfil 
expectations of masculinity by acting violently (Pearce 2007a). Much of Norbert 
Elias’s civilising story of violence decline, is a story of male on male interpersonal 
violence. It could not be understood without discussions of shame and honour in the 
male social psyche and the ease with which violence communicates meanings around 
these norms. The statistics on male on male violence continue to tell a story, whose 
significance is best acknowledged through an appreciation of the differentiated 
gendered meanings of violence:  
 
“Fatal violence is not distributed evenly among sex and age groups. Males account 
for 82% of all homicide victims and have estimated rates of homicide that are more 
than four times those of females (10.8 and 2.5, respectively, per 100 000) …. The 
highest estimated rates of homicide in the world are found among males aged 15–29 
years (18.2 per 100 000), followed closely by males aged 30–44 years (15.7 per 100 
000). Estimated rates of homicide among females range from 1.2 per 100 000 in ages 
5–14 years, to 3.2 per 100 000 in the age group 15–29 years” (WHO 2014) 
 
In Latin America, a new word (feminicide) began to be used in the new millenium to 
make visible the differential meanings of killing women rather than men. Not only is 
the killing of women (femicide) mostly hidden in the homicide statistics, but more 
especially, the killing of women because they are women (feminicide). A new 
addition to the lexicon of violence, is due to the breaking of silences and the 
accumulated social action on violence which gathered pace in the late twentieth 
century. 
 
Conclusion: The Politicisation of Violence in a Reverse Re-Coupling 
 
We are ready to move away from contested claims about legitimacy and violence, 
with the State being defined through its claim to a successful monopoly of its 
legitimate use. A politics which assumes a human ontology of violence contained 
by a ‘legitimate’ State monopoly, has enabled the State to decide which violences 
are criminal and pathological, but leaving many unrecognised or misrecognized 
(Bourdieu 2004). Not only is our politics unable to address the multiple 
expressions of the phenomenon of violence, it is also vulnerable to their use and 
misuse by the State and those seeking state power. At the time of writing this 
paper alone, the evidence has mounted of state and non state violences impacting 
on the electoral process itself, e.g. anti-Semitic attacks, racist abuse and death 
threats to UK politicians during the June 2017 election; the torture and murder of a 
senior Kenyan election official just prior to the July 2017 election; in Venezuela, 
the deaths of 14 people in clashes with security forces during voting for President 
Maduro’s controversial constitutional assembly also in July 2017. 
 
If violence as a phenomenon becomes a central political issue, taking into account 
new knowledge about the social mechanisms of its reproduction, a case could be 
made that politics and the State should be the arena for addressing it rather than 
monopolising it. The idea of a central monopoly appeals intuitively, particularly 
when such monopoly is actively contested. It could be argued some form of 
enforcement and thus violence as law, will be needed as violence sensibilities 
expose more aspects of violence and until our sensibilities towards violence 
challenge our understandings of revenge and punishment. However, to define the 
State through monopolization ignores the history of violence reproduction as well 
as reduction over time of some violences in some contexts, that this has entailed. 
The focus on what the State is and the tools politics should employ, should not 
rely on its relationship to violence per se, but to how it builds the conditions to live 
without violence.  A politics which begins from the vulnerability of the social 
body to the impacts of varied forms of somatic harm, would offer a conceptual 
foundation more attune with most recent knowledge of violence. From within 
politics, the recognition that violence inhibits participation, preserves inequality 
(which, in turn, correlates with violence, Wilkinson and Pickett, 2011 ) and 
distorts if not destroys democracy, could lead to the politicisation of violence as a 
central concern of politics and the State, but one which does not constitute either. 
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